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Abstract Although previous studies have demonstrated that religious people in
Europe have larger families, the role played by religious socialisation in the context
of contemporary fertility behaviour has not yet been analysed in detail. This con-
tribution specifically looks at the interrelation between religious socialisation and
current religiosity and their impact on the transition to the third child for Dutch
women. It is based on data of the first wave of the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study
(2002–2004) and uses event history analysis. The transitions to first, second and
third birth are modelled jointly with a control for unobserved heterogeneity. The
findings provide evidence for an impact of women’s current church attendance as
well as religious socialisation measured by their fathers’ religious affiliation, when
they were teenagers. A religious family background remains influential even when a
woman has stopped attending church. The effects of religious indicators strengthen
over cohorts. Moreover, the combined religious make-up of the respondent’s parents
also significantly determines the progression to the third child.
Keywords Religion  Fertility  Third child  Netherlands  Event history analysis
Re´sume´ S’il est bien e´tabli que les croyants en Europe ont plus d’enfants que les
autres, le roˆle de la socialisation religieuse dans le contexte de la fe´condite´ con-
temporaine n’a pas encore e´te´ analyse´ a` ce jour. Cette e´tude s’inte´resse au lien entre
la socialisation religieuse et la religiosite´ actuelle, et a` leur impact sur la probabilite´
d’agrandissement de deux a` trois enfants de la descendance des femmes ne´er-
landaises. Les donne´es exploite´es sont celles de la premie`re vague du Panel
Ne´erlandais d’Etude de la Parente´ (the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study, 2002–
2004). A l’aide des techniques de l’analyse des biographies, les probabilite´s
C. Berghammer (&)
Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy of Sciences, Wohllebengasse 12–14/6th floor,
1040 Vienna, Austria
e-mail: caroline.berghammer@oeaw.ac.at
123
Eur J Population (2009) 25:297–324
DOI 10.1007/s10680-009-9185-y
d’agrandissement de rang 1, rang 2 et rang 3 ont e´te´ mode´lise´es de fac¸on conjointe,
en controˆlant l’he´te´roge´ne´ite´ non observe´e. Les re´sultats mettent en e´vidence
l’impact de la fre´quentation actuelle de l’e´glise par les femmes et de leur sociali-
sation religieuse, mesure´e par l’appartenance religieuse de leur pe`re quand elles
e´taient adolescentes. Il apparaıˆt que la religiosite´ du contexte familial exerce une
influence, meˆme quand la femme ne fre´quente plus l’e´glise, et que les effets des
indicateurs de pratique religieuse se renforcent d’une ge´ne´ration a` l’autre. Enfin,
l’appartenance religieuse conjointe des parents de la femme de´termine signific-
ativement la probabilite´ d’avoir un troisie`me enfant.
Mots-cle´s Religion  Fe´condite´  Troisie`me enfant  Pays-Bas 
Analyse biographique
1 Introduction
In demography, several theoretical concepts, among them most prominently the
second demographic transition (e.g. Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Lesthaeghe
1995), have emphasised the importance of cultural norms and values in explaining
demographic behaviour. Taking up this idea, the present study analyses the link
between fertility behaviour and religion in the Netherlands. Its focus is on the
progression to the third birth, a transition that has substantially declined. As a result,
only around one quarter of women in the 1945–1965 birth cohorts have three or
more children. We may hypothesise that couples opting for more than the modal
number of two children exhibit distinctive demographic and socio-economic
features, among them presumably also higher religiosity. This contribution
specifically studies the interrelation between religious socialisation and current
religiosity and their impact on the transition to the third child for Dutch women.
Differently from the United States where a large number of studies on the
interrelations between fertility and religion exist,1 only few studies have deliber-
ately addressed this issue for European countries. In general, they agree on a
positive correlation between religiosity and fertility ideals, intentions and actual
fertility. Adsera (2006b) investigates religious variables as a correlate of the ideal
number of children across different western countries. She ascertains that the ideal
number of children of religiously affiliated men and women is significantly higher
than that of their non-affiliated peers and finds differences between the denomi-
nations (pp. 279–281). Among younger cohorts, however, and in particular among
women, the ideal number of children of Catholics does not differ significantly from
that of mainline Protestants (p. 283). Adsera also concludes that church attendance
is a strong predictor of a higher ideal number of children, especially for women, and
a stronger determinant for younger generations than for older ones. Philipov and
Berghammer (2007) studied the impact of several religious measures on fertility
ideals, intentions and behaviour in 18 European countries. They confirm that
1 A few studies on fertility and union formation considered religious socialisation (e.g. Janssen and
Hauser 1981; Lehrer 2004).
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belonging to a religious denomination is significant for the ideal number of children,
but only find denominational differences in a few countries. Their findings show that
church attendance proves to be slightly more important for predicting the ideal
family size than affiliation and self-assessed religiosity. Moreover, they note a
stronger effect of religiosity on fertility ideals than on intentions (p. 281).
Apparently, religious people have a higher ideal family size and plan to have more
children, but can we also observe an effect of religiosity on the actual number of
children? Indeed, Philipov and Berghammer report a correlation between measures
of religiosity and fertility behaviour in virtually all countries studied. So do Frejka
and Westoff (2008), who show that the risk of having two or more children is
associated with different measures of religiosity in different regions of Europe. In
southern Europe, church attendance significantly determines the progression to
higher order births, while the measure of the importance of religion is most relevant
in western Europe (p. 26). Based on country-specific analyses, Adsera (2006a), Brose
(2006), Heineck (2006) and Re´gnier-Loilier and Prioux (2008) prove that there is a
link between religiosity and fertility in Spain, West Germany, Austria and France.
During the past two decades, a number of studies examined the transition to the
third birth in several European countries (Britain: Wright et al. 1987, Nı´ Bhrolcha´in
1993; Turkey: Yavuz 2006; Sweden: Hoem & Hoem 1989, Heckman and Walker
1990, Murphy 1992, Berinde 1999) as well as comparatively for 15 countries
(Callens and Croux 2005). These studies were interested in establishing the
individual characteristics that are conducive to having more than the usual number
of two children. Theories on the value of children claim that parents attach different
values to children of different birth order. When parents consider having a third
child, cost and benefit considerations become increasingly important, as Fawcett
asserts (1983, p. 444). Interpreted from the perspective of the second demographic
transition, studies on third births aim to investigate the characteristics of parents
who progress to a third child and thus give family life and bonds priority over
individual autonomy and flexibility. However, having just one child more than most
other families is still less deviant than having four or five children.
In general, studies on third birth that included various measures of religiosity
among the explanatory variables indicate a positive correlation between religiosity
and this parity transition. Corman (2000) found a significant effect of parents’
religiosity on third-birth intensities for Swedish men, but not for women. French
men and women for whom religion was important at the age of 18 are also more
likely to have a third child. Hoem et al. (2001) report a positive association between
self-assessed religiosity and third-birth risk for Austrian women, which is far
stronger than for second births (Prskawetz and Zagaglia 2005, p. 152–153). A study
on the Czech Republic provides evidence for a particularly strong effect of church
attendance on the transition to a third birth. The risk of this transition for women
attending church services at least once a week is twice as high as that of women
attending services less frequently (Pika´lkova´ 2003, p. 872).
Until the early 1960s, the Netherlands stood out by its comparatively high
fertility rate. Only a few countries in central and western Europe—namely Ireland,
Portugal, Poland and Slovakia—exceeded or reached similarly high levels as the
Dutch period total fertility rate (TFR) of 3.12 in 1960 (EUROSTAT 2006, p. 76).
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Van Heek (1956) and Buissink (1971) suggested that the exceedingly high fertility
levels of Catholics were the main drivers behind the Dutch exception. Using more
appropriate data, van Poppel (1985) and Engelen and Hillebrand (1986) were able to
confirm the important role of Catholic fertility.
However, the picture reversed completely in just one decade. By the mid-1970s,
the Dutch fertility rate had almost halved and was well below the European average
at that time (1975: Netherlands 1.66, EU-25 countries 2.02; EUROSTAT 2006, pp.
73 and 76). Compared to other European countries, the TFR currently stands at the
moderately high level of 1.72 (2006 and 2007; CBS 2009). Regarding cohort TFR,
the number of children per woman already started to decline in the cohorts born
from 1920 onwards. This decrease gained momentum for the cohorts born between
1933 and 1947. Then the fertility level remained fairly constant at a value of around
1.9 until the birth cohort of 1960. Only the most recent cohorts that have (almost)
completed childbearing show signs of decline (Festy 1979; Beets 1993; own
computations based on CBS 2007 and EUROSTAT 2007).
The development from a high to a low-fertility regime is partly due to a drastic
downturn in higher order births, rendering them an important study object. Up to
and including the birth cohort 1938, at least 40% of all Dutch women had three or
more children and thereby exceeded the share of two-child mothers. From the birth
cohort 1939 onwards, two children became more frequent than children of parity
three or higher. In the cohorts born between 1945 and 1965, the share of mothers
with three and more children oscillated between 22.0% and 25.7%. A similar trend
emerged for the parity progression ratio to the third birth. In the 1935 birth cohort,
half of all mothers with two children continued childbearing. This fraction dropped
sharply to about 30% in the cohorts born in the late 1940s. Subsequently, the
progression to third births slightly rose up to 38% in 1958 and then continued to
gradually decline (own computations based on CBS 2007 and EUROSTAT 2007).
The present study mainly addresses the following questions: Do religious
upbringing and current religiosity have an impact on the transition to the third child?
If so, which of the two aspects has a stronger effect? How does the interplay
between past and current religiosity determine the probability of having a third
child? How do these effects differ by cohorts and by the combined religious make-
up of parents during the respondents’ adolescent years?
This discrete time event history analysis is based on data from the first wave of
the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study, which was mainly conducted in 2002/2003.
The total sample contains 8,161 respondents (4,741 women and 3,420 men) aged 18
to 79. I included women who were at most 65 years old at the time of the interview.
3,974 women were at risk of a first birth, 2,658 of them were at risk of having a
second birth and 2,086 of these were at risk of having a third child. First, the
transition from second to third birth was estimated as a single process. In the second
step, the probabilities of experiencing a first, second and third birth were modelled
jointly. I added a control for unobserved heterogeneity components that simulta-
neously affect the three processes.
In the following sections, I shall first discuss why current religiosity and religious
socialisation can be assumed to have an impact on people’s fertility behaviour and
outline my hypotheses. The empirical part starts with a presentation of the data and
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measures, which is followed by a description of the statistical method I used for
analysing the data. The findings and results of the models are presented and
interpreted in the subsequent section. A summary concludes the article.
2 Conceptual Background and Research Hypotheses
The question on the reasons for the link between religion and fertility has been
repeatedly addressed (e.g. McQuillan 2004; Chatters and Taylor 2005; Philipov and
Berghammer 2007). The following considerations are most pertinent for the
Christian religion. Due to the small number of adherents to other religions in the
dataset, my empirical analysis only refers to this group.2
The starting point is frequently the pronatalist and pro-family Christian teaching,
which is well documented in the Bible and other texts. Even though adherents may
not implement all parts of the teaching, it can be assumed that they tend to concur
with the views of their church.
Secondly, the regular gathering of the community has been inherent to the
Christian faith from its very beginning. Church networks are relevant for
childbearing in several ways. First of all, members of church networks exchange
emotional, tangible, informational and spiritual support (Taylor and Chatters 1988;
Ellison and George 1994; Krause et al. 2001; Chatters et al. 2002). Researchers have
confirmed the relevance of social support for fertility decisions (Schoen et al. 1997;
Bu¨hler and Philipov 2005; Philipov et al. 2006). Furthermore, the plausibility of
shared Christian norms and values is continuously affirmed through communication
with co-religionists, collective rituals and pastoral indoctrination (Berger 1969). For
example, the high appreciation of motherhood and a high value attached to children
are sustained through collective recognition. Moreover, contact with large families
influences the perceptions about the ideal family size and, in turn, the likelihood of a
higher number of children. Procedures of social regulation and control further
promote compliance.
Religious coping is the third factor accounting for a link between religion and
fertility. One of the functions assigned to religion is assisting believers to cope with
uncertainty and life stress (e.g. Pargament et al. 2000). This constitutes a crucial
component of psychological well-being (Diener et al. 1999, pp. 285–286). Having
children is a decisive point in people’s life that potentially involves uncertainty.
Coping with this challenge could be easier for religious people if they find comfort
in their religion. Research on religious coping frequently deals with illness and has
widely neglected family events. The study by Ventura and Boss (1983) on the
coping strategies of families who have a baby of two or three months constitutes an
exception. The authors distinguish being religious, thankful and content as one
coping strategy. Recent research points out the importance of considering subjective
well-being (Philipov et al. 2006) and uncertainty as factors in understanding union
2 Among the non-Christian religions in the Netherlands, the most numerous adherents are Muslims,
comprising about 5.8% of the population in 2005, and Hindus who amount to about 0.6%. Both religions
registered marked increases during the previous decades. For instance, in 1980, they had represented
1.7% and 0.2% of the Dutch population, respectively (Becker and de Hart 2006, p. 34).
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formation and fertility. Uncertainty may take different forms, ranging from
economic uncertainties (Kohler et al. 2002; Adsera 2005; Mills and Blossfeld 2005)
to partnership instability or not being able to live up to expectations in childrearing
(Fliegenschnee 2006).
Previous research suggests that the influence of religion on fertility is stronger in
more secularised contexts, based on the argument that long-standing secularisation
renders church attendees a rather select group (Adsera 2006a). Until the mid-1960s,
belonging to a certain religious denomination markedly shaped everyday life in the
Dutch system of ‘pillarisation’. Starting at the end of the nineteenth century, Dutch
society had become increasingly segmented according to adherence to the Protestant
or Catholic faith or no religion at all, all of which had developed their own societal
institutions (Bryant 1981; Dekker and Ester 1996). Later on, the rapid erosion of this
system went along with an increase in the share of unaffiliated people. Nowadays,
the Netherlands is notorious for its very high level of non-affiliated people,
amounting to around 40% of the population (Statistics Netherlands 2007, p. 116).
Church attendance also plummeted. In 1970, the Dutch Reformed Church had a
comparatively low level of 50%3 of all members attending church at least every
second week, while Catholics stood at 70% and the conservative stream of the
Protestant churches, i.e. the Calvinists,4 at 90% at that time (Becker and Vink 1994
cited in Lechner 1996, p. 256). The Dutch Reformed had already ceased to regularly
go to church earlier on. Though church attendance among the Dutch Reformed
continued to weaken after 1970, the decrease was clearly less pronounced than
among the Catholics. The Calvinists did best in attracting their members to church.
Like other comparable surveys, the Netherlands Kinship Panel Study shows that
around 20% of all Dutch Catholics attend church at least once a month as compared
to 36% of the Dutch Reformed and 73% of the Calvinists.5
My main interest is to examine the interplay between religious socialisation and
present religiosity and to study the impact of these two components on the transition
to the third child. Various studies corroborate the substantial impact of parents’
religiosity on their children’s religious trajectory. The literature offers two main
explanations for the transmission of values and behaviour from parents to children:
social learning and status similarity (Glass et al. 1986, p. 686; Moen et al. 1997,
pp. 282–283; Grusec et al. 2000; Barber et al. 2002, pp. 54–56). Social learning
occurs as parents serve as role models for their children who learn from their
behaviour and verbalised attitudes. This effect can be supported by active parental
efforts to impose their behaviour and views on their children through affirmation
3 It is a well documented fact that the level of church attendance is overestimated in surveys (e.g.
Hadaway et al. 1993; Marler and Hadaway 1999). The numbers are nevertheless useful for comparing
denominations and tracking the general trend.
4 The Dutch Reformed Church (Nederlandse Hervormde Kerk) was the main church that originated from
the reformation in the sixteenth century. Two important secessions of conservative streams took place in
the nineteenth century. Most of the secessionists confederated and founded the Reformed Churches in the
Netherlands (Gereformeerde Kerken in Nederland) in 1892, further denoted as Calvinists.
5 More trustworthy estimates obtained with other methods report around 8% regular churchgoers among
the Catholics (KASKI 2007) and 21% among adherents to the Protestant Church in the Netherlands,
which unites large parts of the Dutch Reformed and the Calvinists (Becker and de Hart 2006, p. 32).
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and negative sanctions. Similarity between parents’ and children’s socio-economic
status, i.e. ethnicity, education, occupational status and economic resources, also
facilitates the transmission of values and behaviour across generations. In this
context, Kalmijn et al. (2006) stress the significance of opportunity structures into
which children can be integrated. Children who get embedded in a church
community become familiar with the rituals, form friendships and potentially find a
marriage partner there (p. 1348).
The intergenerational transmission of religious values and behaviour is obviously
not complete in all cases. For the Netherlands, Need and de Graaf (1996) found that
many young adults left the church in their late teens and early twenties, while this
was rarely the case at higher ages (pp. 93 and 96). Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers
confirmed this conclusion (2001, p. 602) and additionally found that church
attendance tends to be reduced between ages 14 and 26 with a strong peak around
18/19 (p. 597). On the other hand, it is very rare for people who were not exposed to
a religious parental home to adopt religious views and activities themselves (Voas
and Crockett 2005, pp. 21–22). We can, therefore, assume that currently religious
people form a subgroup of those who were socialised in a religious way. They were
selected according to certain characteristics and are still subject to church
influences. Hence, I anticipate that the impact of actual religiosity on third-birth
intensities exceeds that of religious socialisation (Hypothesis 1)
The dataset at hand offers three measures of present religiosity: affiliation,
frequency of attending religious services and membership in a religious or church
association. Though they were most crucial in previous decades, denominational
fertility differences have become by and large negligible ever since the mid-1960s
(Somers and Van Poppel 2003). Indicating a religious affiliation can be purely
nominal. The share of nominal Christians seems to be highest among the Dutch
Catholics who have the lowest share of churchgoers. It might seem surprising that so
many of those who do not regularly attend mass nevertheless state that they are
Catholics, but we can speculate that this behaviour is rooted in their former minority
status and that Catholicism therefore is an important marker of their cultural
identity. Church attendance, by contrast, involves active participation which only a
subgroup of affiliated persons is willing to undertake. Several publications indicate
that in European countries church attendance is more predictive of fertility ideals
and behaviour than affiliation (Adsera 2006b; Philipov and Berghammer 2007).
Respondents who confirm that they are a member in a religious or church
association may think of a range of different groups or organisations. Due to this
large variation, members will presumably not behave very differently from those
who do not belong to any such association. Hence this measure is assumed to be less
determining for the transition to a third birth than church attendance. Therefore, I
expect that church attendance is a stronger predictor of progression to third birth
than religious affiliation or membership of a religious or church association
(Hypothesis 2)
My third hypothesis is based on the argument that religious upbringing continues
to have a bearing on fertility behaviour, even if religious participation has been
abandoned. Internalisation of values in the formative years may be deeply rooted.
Furthermore, parents might still impose control on their grown-up children (Axinn
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and Thornton 1993) and childhood friends and acquaintances might also influence
them. Thus, religious socialisation has an influence even if the person is no longer
engaging in religious activities (Hypothesis 3)
The impressive extent of the decline in religiosity is reflected in the decrease of
religious socialisation over birth cohorts. As religiosity has eroded during the past
decades and has left the religious an increasingly select group, it seems reasonable
to expect that it has a differential influence on the transition to the third birth by
cohorts. Past and current religiosity are more salient predictors of third births for
younger than for older cohorts (Hypothesis 4)
My last hypothesis relates to the impact of the parents’ combined religious make-
up at the time the woman was 15 years old on her later fertility behaviour. Based on
the arguments presented so far, the third-birth intensities are presumed to be lowest,
if neither parent has any religious affiliation. But which outcome can we expect
when the respondent grew up with religiously homogeneous versus heterogeneous
parents? If we assume that both partners in a heterogeneous parental couple have the
same relative influence, the respondent’s final decision is expected to lie somewhere
between the two positions. The underlying reasoning draws on the so-called
‘bargaining effect’. Decisions in such areas as female employment or fertility are
the result of a compromise between the partners (Lehrer 1996a, p. 175; Lehrer
1996b, pp. 147–148). This means that parents’ religious heterogeneity can either
enhance or decrease fertility as compared to a homogeneous affiliated parental
couple, depending on the kind of denominations involved, with those holding more
pro-natalistic views inducing a higher risk. This reasoning is also valid if only one
parent is religiously affiliated. In most cases, this probably implies that the third-
birth risk is somewhere between that of women whose two parents are non-affiliated
versus those whose two parents are affiliated.
In further specifying this hypothesis, we can add that the marriage of an affiliated
and a non-affiliated person might signal that religion is not of prime interest to the
partner adhering to a religion, otherwise it would have been a stronger selection
criterion for choosing a spouse. On the other hand, not giving up religious affiliation in
a country with a high degree of secularisation and a non-religious spouse might
indicate stable beliefs. As the two last mentioned considerations would influence
fertility behaviour in different directions, the original hypothesis need not be revised.
Summing up, the risk of having third child is anticipated to be lowest for
respondents with non-affiliated parents, followed by those with only one affiliated
parent. Respondents with religiously heterogamous parents and those whose two
parents are affiliated to the same denomination constitute the groups with the
highest third-birth risks, depending on the denominations involved (Hypothesis 5)
3 Data and Method
3.1 Netherlands Kinship Panel Study
The data used in this study were taken from the first wave of the Netherlands
Kinship Panel Study (NKPS), which was conducted between 2002 and 2004
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(Dykstra et al. 2005) and is a random sample of 8,161 individuals (4,741 women and
3,420 men) living in private households in the Netherlands. The respondents were
18 to 79 years old.
The data were collected in two stages. First, the respondents gave computer-aided
personal interviews (CAPI). Then they filled in a self-completion questionnaire. The
dataset contains complete fertility and relationship histories and a wide range of
socio-economic variables. It is also particularly rich in questions on religiosity.
These items were part of the self-completion questionnaire designed to minimise
response bias. The information includes data on religious denomination, frequency
of church attendance, membership of a religious or church organisation and
importance of religion and the church at age 15. Additionally, the respondents were
asked about the religious denomination their mother and father belonged to, when
they were 15 years old.
The low response rate of 45% is comparable to other Dutch surveys and can
partly be explained by high male non-response. Of all respondents participating in
the study 92% returned the self-completion questionnaire.
3.2 Questions Pertaining to Religion
Let us now take a closer look at the four questions dealing with religion. The first
question is about the respondent’s and his/her mother’s and father’s religious
affiliation: ‘‘Do you count yourself as belonging to a particular faith, religious
denomination or church? If so, which one? Please also indicate whether this was
the case for your father and mother when you were 15 years old. No religion,
Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed Church, Calvinist (synodal), Other Calvinist
denominations (e.g. Christian Reformed, Dutch Calvinists, Reformed Community),
Evangelical church denominations (e.g. Full Evangelical church, Pentecostal
church, Baptists, Community of the Moravian Brethren), Other Christian church
denominations, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Other.’’
Like the other religious variables, affiliation to a certain religion is studied in a
cross-sectional way, which limits me to treating this variable as time-constant. In
fact, there is evidence for the Netherlands that changes in religious affiliation follow
a cohort rather than an age-path (Need and de Graaf 1996, pp. 93 and 96; Te
Grotenhuis and Scheepers 2001, p. 602). However, as studies on this issue are
scarce, it is not possible to draw definite conclusions. Hence inferring causality is
not fully warranted.
As a retrospective measure, parents’ affiliation at the time the respondent was
15 years old is not subject to such considerations. Yet two limitations have to be
noted: selective recollection of respondents and the question whether they would
report an affiliation if their parents were baptised but did not practise their religion
(Adsera 2007, p. 228).
The following levels were constructed for using this variable in the statistical
analyses: no religion, Roman Catholic, Dutch Reformed, Calvinist (synodal),
Calvinist (orthodox) and others. I decided to keep the orthodox Calvinists as a
separate category because the descriptive analysis showed that their fertility levels
markedly differ from those recorded for the other Protestant groups. Moreover, in
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2004, the synodal but not the orthodox Calvinists merged with the Dutch Reformed
Church.
The next question addresses the frequency of attending religious services and
thus serves as a measure for the degree of collective religious practice: ‘‘About
how often do you currently attend services at a church or community of faith?
Hardly ever/never, once or a few times a year, once or a few times a month,
once or a few times a week.’’ This question permits us to draw conclusions on
how close respondents are to the church, to which extent they agree with and are
exposed to its teaching and, presumably, integrated into a church network.
However, church attendance need not reflect personal conviction, but might also
be driven by convention or even social pressure. This might be less relevant in
urban areas, but more pronounced in the countryside or in regions where
orthodox Calvinism prevails. Two considerations are particularly noteworthy
when utilising this measure. First, church has a more central position in
Catholicism than in Protestantism. Catholics are thus obliged to attend church
services on Sundays and holidays, while Protestants attach greater value to such
other expressions of faith as reading and interpreting the Bible. As the
differences are not crucial, I shall utilise this measure uniformly. Second, church
attendance was only measured at the time the survey was done. Strictly
speaking, this rules out conclusions on causal relations. However, analyses
pertaining to European countries unanimously state that church attendance tends
to be reduced in young adult age and remains thereafter, at least throughout
childbearing age (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 1988; Te Grotenhuis and Scheepers
2001; Tilley 2003; Voas and Crockett 2005; Crockett and Voas 2006). Some US
studies are in line with this finding while others emphasise the changes of church
attendance with age.
I kept the original answering categories for my statistical analysis: hardly ever or
never, once or a few times a year, once or a few times a month, once or a few times a
week. Only women belonging to a Christian denomination were included in this
variable, i.e. the denominations already specified plus Evangelical and other
Christian church denominations. This restriction is justified by the rather homoge-
neous meaning of church services within this group.
Respondents who affirmatively answered the question ‘‘Are you a member of any
of the following clubs or voluntary associations?…Religious or church association’’
may have thought of a range of different clubs or associations, e.g. Bible study
groups, parental or youth groups organised by the church, ecumenical discussion
groups, membership in the board of a religious school or subscription to a religious
periodical. I used the response categories of yes and no in my regression models.
In the last question, the focus is on religious socialisation: ‘‘At the age of 15: In
our home, issues linked with religion and the church were considered to be very
important. Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly
disagree.’’ Parents’ key role in the transmission of religious values to their children
has been repeatedly confirmed. Kelley and de Graaf (1997) found that in secular
nations like the Netherlands—more than in religious ones—the family is of
paramount importance for religious socialisation. Contact with religion, for
example during religious education at school, through religious peers or religious
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festivities, does not come naturally in such a context. The family is usually the only
institution that is capable of transmitting religious world-views and accustoming
children to religious practices and a religious surrounding. In the empirical analysis,
I recoded the originally five answering categories of this variable into three, namely
(very) important, middle, (very) unimportant.
3.3 Method
The technique used in this study is event history analysis, which models the rate
of occurrence of an event. This rate indicates the risk for the event to occur per
time interval, provided the individual is still at risk at the start of the interval.
According to the information available in the data set, time is measured in years.
The effects of the covariates indicate the factor by which this baseline hazard is
proportionally shifted. In this analysis, the key issue are the effects of the
religious variables rather than the shape of the baseline hazard. Modelling was
done in two different ways. As a first step, a model for the transition to the third
birth was estimated separately. The population at risk were women at parity two
and the baseline hazard referred to the years since the birth of their second child.
However, previous studies (e.g. Kravdal 2001; Kreyenfeld 2002) demonstrated
that first and second child mothers, respectively, are selected along certain
criteria, among them perhaps greater family proneness. This trait is not captured
by the covariates included in the equation for the third birth, but remains
unobserved, which is why parameter estimation leads to biased results. Studying
the effect of educational level on third birth rates in Norway, Kravdal (2001)
proposed modelling the transition to first, second and third birth simultaneously
and to add a common factor for unobserved heterogeneity to each of the
equations as a control for these characteristics. In cases of repeated events, such
as consecutive births, sufficient information for each individual is then available
and renders identifying unobserved factors unproblematic. It does not seem
reasonable to assume that the births experienced by one individual are
independent events, but rather that shared factors influence all of them. I
therefore assumed the person-specific unobserved heterogeneity to be identical in
all three equations and to be normally distributed with a mean of 0 and a
variance of r2. The test examines if this component is positive and significantly
different from zero. Therefore, as a second step, the three parity transitions were
estimated in a joint model which also includes an unobserved heterogeneity
term. The analysis was conducted using the statistical software package aML
2.09 (Lillard and Panis 2003).
As the information on childbirth is only available on an annual basis, I used
a discrete time logit model (Allison 1984, p. 17). I split the basic time factor,
time elapsed since age 15, since first or second birth, into intervals which
permitted me to separately model the risk for each time interval. I assumed that
the hazard is constant throughout one interval but can vary between different
intervals. The women were considered to be in the population at risk either
until the time the birth occurred or until they were censored at age 45 or at the
time of the survey.
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Apart from the explanatory variables on religiosity, the following five time-
constant covariates were included in the models: age at first birth6 (only in second
and third-birth models), interval between first and second birth7 (only in third-birth
models), birth cohort,8 education9 and number of siblings.10 Union status11 entered
the regression equations as time-varying regressor. I also experimented with the
inclusion of the variables age at second birth, country of residence at age 15, urban
or rural residence at age 15, sex composition of previous children and if the
respondent ever had a paid job, but since they did not further enlighten the link
between religiosity and progression to third birth I excluded them in the models
presented here.
The analysis is solely based on the biological children the women had either with
the current, the previous or without a steady partner. Records with adopted children,
twins at first or second birth, respectively, and cases in which the first or second
child died before the birth of the second or third one were excluded. Women were
also censored if they were below 15 or above 45 years of age at the birth of their
first, second or third child. When first and second or second and third birth occurred
in the same year or the first or second birth took place in the year of the survey,
records were omitted due to non-exposure. Furthermore, respondents who were
older than 65 at the time of interview were excluded from the analysis. This
approach was chosen because I assumed that religiosity is prone to changes after
that age. Women are exposed to a shift in their social position (mainly withdrawal
from the labour force) and changes in time allocation. Deteriorating physical
abilities might prevent them from participating in certain activities and there is a
high likelihood that they will face existential questions as their own life and that of
others nears its end. The final total number of women included in the analysis for the
first child was 3,974, for the second child 2,658 and for the third child 2,086
(unweighted).
6 The respondents were divided into three categories (young, middle and old) in the proportion 1:2:1.
Young women were defined as those aged 16–23 at the birth of their first child, middle-aged women as
those 24–29 and old women as those aged 30–41 years when they had their first child.
7 The constructed time intervals are 0–1, 2, 3, 4 and 5? years.
8 The respondents were assigned to the following birth cohorts: 1937–1944, 1945–1954, 1955–1964 and
1965–1979.
9 The levels of education were constructed according to the International Standard Classification of
Education (ISCED). Completed or incomplete elementary school (ISCED 1), lower vocational and lower
general schooling between ages 12–15 or 16, respectively (ISCED 2) were defined as low education.
Intermediate education comprises completed intermediate general secondary, upper general secondary
and intermediate vocational training between ages 15/16 and 17–20 (ISCED 3). High education refers to
women who accomplished their higher vocational, university or post-graduate training taking place
between ages 17/18 to 20–24 (ISCED 5). Being in education constitutes the forth category. Education,
even though in principle time-varying, enters as a time-constant covariate, which should not be
problematic as very few people complete their education after the birth of their second child (Hoem et al.
2001, p. 252).
10 I differentiate between respondents who have 0, 1, 2 or 3 and more siblings.
11 Union status comprises the following states: no union, cohabitation, first order marriage, higher order
marriage.
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Table 1 lists the percentage distribution of the respondents within levels of the
religious variables by parity. It shows all cohorts (1937–1979) as well as older
(1937–1954) and younger cohorts (1955–1979) separately. The choice of cohorts is
based on the state of religion during their socialisation. The system of pillarisation
ended when the youngest among the 1937–1954 cohorts were adolescents and thus
still exposed to a strong religious influence unlike the younger cohorts that grew up
when religion was waning.
4 Descriptive Analysis
First, I present the parity distribution by importance of religion in the parental
home at age 15 and current church attendance (Fig. 1). The highest panel
represents women who were socialised in a religious parental home and still
frequently go to church. This group has the lowest share of childless women and
one-child mothers. Almost 60% of these women have three or more children. The
bottom bar corresponds to women who were not exposed to religious socialisation
and do not attend church. Childless women are clearly most numerous in this
group, which has the largest share of two-child mothers. Only 22% give birth to a
third or higher order child. The parity distribution of women who were raised in a
religious environment but abandoned church attendance later in life is somewhere
between the two groups, although their fertility behaviour is closer to that of the
non-religious women. Thirty percent of these women have a third or higher order
child. The number of those who were not exposed to religious socialisation during
adolescence but attended church at the time of the survey is negligible. This first
analysis indicates that past religious influences might be decisive for childbearing
decisions.
Figure 2 shows the cumulative progression to the third birth by combining the
same two variables. Older and younger cohorts are presented separately. The
differences in the propensity to have a third child described above are reflected in
the length of the birth interval between the second and third birth, which follows the
same gradient, i.e. the time until the third birth is shortest for regular church
attendees. Due to fecundity limitations, a deliberate decision for a third child
frequently implies close spacing of all previous births. This point is especially valid
for the Netherlands, where the mean age at first birth is high. The figures for women
who do not attend church and either were or were not brought up in a religious way
differ by around 7.6% and 5%, respectively. They also show a substantial gap to
current church attendees. The levels of the curves are notably elevated for the
younger cohorts. This is in agreement with Hypothesis 4, which predicts a larger
impact of religious indicators for younger cohorts as compared to older ones. The
selection of religious people across cohorts is also reflected in the relative size of the
category ‘Religious socialisation and church attendance’. Among the older cohorts
the share is 21%, but only 12% among the younger cohorts. The group with no
religious socialisation and no church attendance has a share of 50% among the
older, but 66% among the younger cohorts.
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5 Results and Interpretation
The main research questions are addressed by consecutive model fitting. My first
strategy was to single out the most relevant aspect of religion for the transition
to the third child by referring to past or current religiosity and to investigate the
relations between the variables. I used the second set of models to determine
whether religious socialisation has an impact even in the absence of present
religiosity. In the third step, I tested the assumption that the effect of religion is
stronger for younger than for older cohorts by performing the analyses separately
for cohorts born from 1937 to 1954 and those born between 1955 and 1979.
Finally, I studied the link between parents’ combined religious make-up and
third-birth intensities.
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
In the past somewhat or
(very) unimportant, now
church attendance once per
year or less often
In the past (very) important,
now church attendance once
per year or less often
In the past (very) important,
now church attendance at
least once per month
Childless One child Two children Three children Four and more children
Fig. 1 Parity distribution of Dutch women aged 37 to 65 (cohorts 1937–1964) by importance of religion
in the parental home at age 15 and church attendance (weighted)
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Fig. 2 Cumulative progression rate to third birth of Dutch women by importance of religion at age 15
and church attendance
312 C. Berghammer
123
5.1 Past and Present Religiosity
In the following, I shall only present the models, in which the three parity transitions
were estimated jointly and unobserved heterogeneity was inserted (estimates on the
transition to the third birth are available from the author upon request). As this factor
is positive and significant in all cases, I conclude that the women indeed differ
according to unobserved characteristics that influence fertility behaviour. Most
importantly, however, the sizes of the coefficients increase. Omitting unobserved
women-specific characteristics underestimates the link between religiosity and the
decision to have a third child. As we do not know what the unobserved heterogeneity
component represents, the interpretation of this finding is bound to be speculative.
Let us start by assuming different shares of family-prone women in the religious
versus the non-religious group. Children and the family play a central role in
Christian faith and, as expected, the share of family-oriented women is higher in the
religious than in the non-religious group. Supported by empirical evidence as shown
in Fig. 1, this implies that religious women are more prone to opt for a first and
second child than non-religious respondents. Besides the women’s personal family
orientation, ‘religion-specific reasons’ such as adapting behaviour of co-religionists,
receiving support that facilitates the childbearing decision or normative pressure, e.g.
from parents, may also play a role in the decision for a(nother) child. On the other
hand, merely non-religious women with a family orientation select themselves into
the group of one and two-child mothers. As a consequence, their share among
mothers is larger than among childless women and they are, in turn, also more prone
to have a third child. The stronger self-selection among non-religious women reduces
the differences in the shares of non-family-prone women and decreases the effect of
religiosity. The unobserved heterogeneity is interpreted as family proneness and the
true effect of religiosity is only revealed when we control for it.
Model 1 in Table 2 deals with women’s religious socialisation. The third-birth
intensity of those in whose parental home religion was (very) important is 91%
higher as compared to those where religion was (very) unimportant. Adding
membership in religious or church associations in Model 2 confirms that members
have a higher progression risk than non-members, even though this effect disappears
once we add religious affiliation to the equation (Model 3). The third-birth intensity
of Roman Catholics does not significantly differ from that of non-affiliated women,
lending support to the notion that, in the Netherlands, Roman Catholicism mainly
reflects cultural belonging. The coefficients of the members of the Dutch Reformed
and the mainline Calvinists are fairly similar. Orthodox Calvinists have the highest
progression risk, i.e. 2.40 times that of the reference category. However, when we
introduce church attendance (Model 4), it absorbs most of the effects of the other
variables, being strongly positive itself. The third-birth intensity increases with each
level of church attendance and peaks at more than the double risk for women who
attend church once or a few times a week as compared to those who never attend.
Women who go to church once per year or month are closer in their progression risk
than the other categories and located somewhere in the middle between the two
extremes. The fact that religious affiliation is almost insignificant indicates that the
differences between the denominations can primarily be attributed to the different
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intensity of religious practice. In other words, the observed disparities in fertility are
not due to differences in teaching on childbearing and family-related issues but
rather to differences in the women’s devotion to the church and its teaching.
In the last model, the respondent’s religious affiliation is substituted by another
measure of religious socialisation, namely the father’s affiliation at the time the
respondent was 15 years of age. The father’s affiliation yielded a stronger effect
than that of the mother.12 Except for Roman Catholics, all levels are significantly
Table 2 Association between measures of religiosity and third-birth rates of Dutch women born 1937–
1979
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Importance of religion and church in the parental home at age 15
(Very) Unimportant 1 1 1 1 1
Neither—nor 1.29* 1.24 1.17 1.13 1.05
(Very) Important 1.91*** 1.70*** 1.49*** 1.30** 1.17
Membership in religious or church association
No 1 1 1 1
Yes 1.73*** 1.27 0.97 1.02
Religious affiliation
None 1 1
Roman Catholic 1.13 0.82
Dutch Reformed 1.89*** 1.43**
Calvinist 2.07*** 1.35
Calvinist (orthodox) 2.40*** 1.45
Church attendance
Hardly ever/Never 1 1
At least once a year 1.67*** 1.54***
At least once a month 2.08*** 1.95***
At least once a week 2.82*** 2.79***
Father’s religious affiliation
None 1
Roman Catholic 1.29
Dutch Reformed 1.64***
Calvinist 1.92***
Calvinist (orthodox) 1.99**
Unobserved heterogeneity 0.89*** 0.88*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.86***
Discrete time logit model (relative rates)
Controlled for age at first birth (only in second and third-birth models), interval between first and second
birth (only in third-birth models), cohort, education, number of siblings, union status
Missing values and the category ‘other religion’ are not shown but were controlled for
Significance levels: * P B 0.10; ** P B 0.05; *** P B 0.01
12 This finding is in line with those of Neuman (2007, p. 221) and Adsera (2007, p. 227) who report that
differently to mother’s practice, father’s mass attendance when the respondent was age 12 had a positive
effect on the latter’s current family size.
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different from the baseline category ‘no affiliation’. Regarding the size of the
coefficients, the denominations exhibit the same rank as in the respondent’s
affiliation. That father’s religious affiliation is significant is a rather unexpected
finding granted that the respondent’s own affiliation did not evince any statistically
significant association, when controlling for church attendance. Further analysis
showed that when combining respondent’s and father’s affiliation as well as church
attendance in one model, the father’s affiliation also proved to be more important
than the woman’s own affiliation (model not shown). Bivariate analysis disclosed
that respondent’s affiliation and church attendance are more strongly correlated than
father’s affiliation and church attendance. Therefore, the results of the models
support the interpretation that the father’s affiliation reflects religious socialisation
as opposed to current religiosity, which is measured by church attendance or
respondent’s affiliation. However, both measures are equally important.
To analyse this finding in more detail, I constructed and included an interaction
between the father’s and the female respondent’s affiliation while controlling for
church attendance. As shown by Model 6 in Table 3, the socialisation effect
persists. On the one hand, the category of non-affiliated women comprises women
whose fathers belonged to a certain religion and, on the other hand, those whose
fathers were non-affiliated when they were 15 years old. The interaction term
suggests that the third-birth risk of non-affiliated respondents whose father was
Catholic or Dutch Reformed is about 50–60% higher as compared to those who
have a non-religious family background.
We can conclude that the non-affiliated women consist of two groups: firstly,
those without a religious family background who display the lowest third-birth
intensity and, secondly, those with a religious family background whose third-birth
intensity is elevated. As a consequence of this mixture, the non-affiliated women do
not differ significantly from the affiliated women (Table 2, Model 4). However, if
we incorporate the father’s instead of the respondent’s affiliation, non-affiliated
women with an elevated risk due to their religious background are found in the same
group as the affiliated ones and thus differ from those who are non-affiliated
(Table 2, Model 5).
Model 7 pursues a similar strategy in that it comprises an interaction between
past and current religiosity, the latter being represented by the respondent’s church
attendance. The findings lead to the same conclusion: women whose father was
religiously affiliated during their adolescence and who do not regularly attend
church show an elevated third birth rate as compared to their counterparts with a
non-affiliated father. The probability of having a third child is even higher for
women who still go to church.
Summarising, we can say that, in disagreement with Hypothesis 1, both religious
socialisation and current religiosity are linked with having a third child. Among the
measures of current religiosity, church attendance is a stronger determinant than
religious affiliation and membership, as assumed in Hypothesis 2. Concerning
religious socialisation, the father’s affiliation is a more relevant predictor than the
importance of church and religion in the parental home at age 15. The findings
confirm Hypothesis 3, which predicts an effect of religious socialisation even if the
person is currently not religious.
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5.2 The Influence of Past and Present Religiosity over Cohorts
The subsequent models are fitted separately for older and younger cohorts. They
compare women who were born between 1937 and 1954 (n = 939) with those born
between 1955 and 1979 (n = 1,147). I hypothesised that, over cohorts, the
behaviour of religious persons would become increasingly distinctive as compared
to that of their non-religious peers since the secularisation process makes them an
increasingly select group. The data support this assumption.
Model 9 reveals that, among the older cohorts, weekly and monthly church
attendees have significantly higher third-birth intensities than women who never go
to church. The coefficient for the yearly attendees is also relatively large. The
effects gain in strength over the cohorts under observation. To compare all other
groups to the lowest church attendance category for both cohorts, I changed the
reference category. For women born between 1955 and 1979, the regression
coefficients monotonously increase with the frequency of church attendance. In a
surrounding characterised by low church attendance, the third-birth risk of yearly
church attendees closely resembles that of the monthly church attendees in previous
generations when both are compared to the non-attendees of their generations.
The results are less clear-cut for the father’s affiliation (Model 11). The
coefficients do not unanimously get stronger over cohorts. For the older cohorts,
having a Catholic father versus a non-affiliated father did not yield any significant
differences in the third-birth rate, while it did for the younger cohorts. However, the
large effect size of the older cohort does not permit a final conclusion.
Introducing an interaction between father’s affiliation and church attendance
reveals that a religious background continues to exert an influence on fertility
outcome even in case of no church attendance at present for the younger but not for
the older cohorts (Model 13). In fact, young female non-churchgoers whose fathers
belonged to a religious denomination during their adolescence are 72% more likely
to proceed to a third birth than those who were not exposed to religious
socialisation. Not surprisingly, the coefficients are even more elevated for those
women who continued to attend religious services until the time of the survey. In
general, the findings of these three models are in line with Hypothesis 4: the effect
of religiosity on third births increases by cohorts (Table 4).
5.3 Parental Homogamy
The final step was to analyse whether differences in progression to a third birth are
discernible based on the religious make-up of the respondents’ parents. Hypothesis
5 assumes the following ranking from lowest to highest transition rates to third
births: (1) respondents with non-affiliated parents, (2) respondents with only one
parent adhering to a faith, (3) women with religiously heterogeneous or
homogeneous parents depending on the kind of denominations involved. The
findings only partly support this hypothesis.
The results obtained with Model 14, which contains an interaction between
father’s and mother’s affiliation, do not confirm the assumption of differential
fertility behaviour if both parents are not affiliated or one of them—mostly the
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father—does not indicate any belonging. Previous research has pointed out that
women are more reluctant than men to leave the church (Te Grotenhuis and
Scheepers 2001, p. 601). If this observation is due to the fact that women keep
declaring a membership even if they are not convinced and practising, it
could explain the results obtained with this model. Except for Roman
Table 4 Association between measures of religiosity and third-birth rates of Dutch women born 1937–
1979, by cohorts
Model 8 Model 9
All cohorts Older cohorts Younger cohorts
Church attendance
Hardly ever/never 1 1 1 [1.52]
At least yearly 1.57*** 1.32 1.81***
At least monthly 2.26*** 1.72** 3.21***
At least weekly 3.98*** 3.69*** 4.31***
Unobserved heterogeneity 0.86*** 0.86***
Model 10 Model 11
All cohorts Older cohorts Younger cohorts
Father’s religious affiliation
None 1 1 1 [1.47]
Roman Catholic 1.61*** 1.42 1.76***
Dutch Reformed 2.16*** 2.25*** 2.09***
Calvinist 2.97*** 3.08*** 2.91***
Calvinist (orthodox) 4.09*** (4.01)*** (4.35)***
Unobserved heterogeneity 0.90*** 0.90***
Model 12 Model 13
All cohorts Older cohorts Younger cohorts
Father’s affiliation Respondent’s church attendance
None Never/yearly 1 1 1 [1.34]
Affiliated Never/yearly 1.61*** 1.44 1.72**
None Monthly/weekly (1.67) – (3.52)
Affiliated Monthly/weekly 3.94*** 3.28*** 4.77***
Unobserved heterogeneity 0.87*** 0.86***
Discrete time logit model (relative rates)
Controlled for age at first birth (only in second and third-birth models), interval between first and second
birth (only in third-birth models), cohort, education, number of siblings, union status
Missing values and the category ‘other religion’ are not shown but were controlled for
Squared brackets indicate the proportional shift relative to the same category of the older cohorts
Brackets indicate that n \ 50
Significance levels: * P B 0.10; ** P B 0.05; *** P B 0.01
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Catholics, respondents with parents affiliated with the same denomination exhibit
higher third-birth intensities than the reference group. Daughters of heterogamous
parents—mostly consisting of one Roman Catholic and one Dutch Reformed—
evince, judging from the regression coefficient, a similar third-birth risk to their
peers with homogeneous parents Table 5.
6 Summary
During the past decade, a number of studies investigated the link between religiosity
and fertility in European countries. Meanwhile, it is a well-established fact that
more religious people have a larger number of children. In the literature, little
attention has been paid to the role of religious socialisation. This is surprising in
view of the great relevance of family background as a determinant for adults’
religiosity.
This study examines the associations between the interplay of past and present
religiosity and progression to third birth using event history analysis. The parity
transitions to first, second and third birth are modelled simultaneously and a factor
representing unobserved heterogeneity is included to control for selectivity in
progressing to a higher order child. Religious effects are stronger when using this
method than when modelling the transition to the third child as a single process.
The expectation regarding religious adults raised in a religious parental home is
clearly that their transition rate to the third child will be higher. But what can we
predict for non-religious adults who were exposed to religious socialisation? Put in a
nutshell, parents shape the religious views and ensuing family values of their
children. Even if the children abandon religiosity later in their lives, they have been
formed by the values internalised in their early years. Moreover, due to the strong
Table 5 Association between parents’ combined religious make-up and third-birth rates of Dutch
women born between 1937–1979
Model 14
Both none 0.96
One none 1
Both Roman Catholic 1.18
Both Dutch Reformed 1.60*
Both Calvinist 1.81**
Both Calvinist (orth.) 2.11**
Both Christian, heterog. 1.63
Unobserved heterogeneity 0.86***
Discrete time logit model (relative rates)
Controlled for age at first birth (only in second and third-birth models), interval between first and second
birth (only in third-birth models), cohort, education, number of siblings, union status
Missing values and the category ‘other religion’ are not shown but were controlled for
Significance levels: * P B 0.10; ** P B 0.05; *** P B 0.01
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social component of religiosity, children socialised in a religious surrounding are
also likely to have religious grandparents and other relatives. Religious parents tend
to promote the integration of their children into church-run children’s playgroups,
choirs and similar groupings, where they also make friends. We may therefore
assume that even if they are no longer practising their religion, religious social
influences remain in place and exert an effect on their childbearing behaviour.
I started the empirical analysis by testing which religious indicator (among those
referring to religious socialisation or current religiosity) is most relevant for the
transition to the third child. Apparently, both church attendance and a measure of
religious socialisation (namely the father’s affiliation when the respondent was 15)
have a strong impact. This result corroborates the importance of religion in the
parental home for the children’s reproductive behaviour. Tying in with previous
evidence, church attendance seems to be a stronger indicator for fertility than other
measures of religiosity (Adsera 2006b; Philipov and Berghammer 2007).
Another conclusion is that non-religious women consist of two groups: those with
and those without a religious family background. The latter are characterised by the
lowest third-birth intensities, while women who were exposed to religious influence
during their adolescence show a significantly higher propensity to have a third child.
Moreover, I was able to demonstrate that the effect of religiosity strengthens over
cohorts. This result is in line with Adsera’s finding for Spain (2006a) and Re´gnier-
Loilier and Prioux’s (2008) finding for French women and supports the assumption
that religious fertility differentials become progressively more apparent as the
religious constitute an increasingly small and select group. This inference holds for
measures of present religiosity as well as for an interaction between past and present
religiosity.
Last but not least, the parents’ combined religious make-up determines the
decision whether to have a third child. Women whose two parents do not adhere to a
religious faith exhibit the lowest progression risk. Unexpectedly, there is no
difference with respect to respondents with one affiliated parent, mostly the mother.
This finding might be explained by the fact that women are more reluctant than men
to leave the church, even if their religiosity might have abated. Moreover, marrying
a non-affiliated partner suggests that religion may not have been highly relevant in
the first place. Apart from Roman Catholics, women with religiously homogamous
parents or Christian heterogamous parents both display a higher third-birth hazard
than those with one or two non-affiliated parents.
Despite the growing number of contributions on religiosity and fertility in
Europe, several issues require more detailed research. First of all, the mechanisms
explaining religious people’s higher fertility are mostly based on speculation, while
a thorough empirical analysis is still lacking. Secondly, the issue of causality
remains unresolved. Theoretical reasoning and empirical results from the US
context point to a two-way causality. Thirdly, even though we know about the
deficiencies of religious measures, i.e. the over-reporting of church attendance in
surveys, data for European countries are still inadequate.
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